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Trade Agreement with Side-Effects? 
European Union and United States to Negotiate 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
Stormy-Annika Mildner and Claudia Schmucker 
At the G8 summit in Northern Ireland on June 17, the European Union and the United 
States kicked off the negotiations for a comprehensive Transatlantic Trade and Invest-
ment Partnership (TTIP) to reduce tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers. While the 
expected economic benefits for both sides would be more than welcome in an era of 
gloomy growth forecasts, a TTIP is not entirely without risks for global trade and the 
multilateral trading system. The talks could tie up a considerable portion of EU and 
US negotiating capacity and divert attention from the WTO Doha Round. More broadly, 
potential trade-diverting effects could function to the detriment of other trading 
partners. Such side-effects should be avoided. The “high road” of international trade 
policy must remain the WTO, with bilateral agreements making sense only as a 
stepping stone to multilateral liberalisation. Alongside the TTIP talks, the Transatlantic 
Partners should therefore continue to push for a conclusion of the Doha Round. And 
the TTIP must be designed to be compatible with WTO rules. 
 
A transatlantic free trade area is not a new 
idea. The project was first proposed in the 
1990s, and resurfaced in 2006/2007 under 
the German EU Presidency. Now talks have 
finally started. On 11 February 2013 the 
High Level Working Group on Jobs and 
Growth of the Transatlantic Economic 
Council (TEC) recommended a comprehen-
sive agreement to abolish tariffs and above 
all to dismantle the non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs) that affect especially industrial 
goods (approval, technical standards, safety 
standards) and agricultural products (hy-
giene and health standards), and customs 
arrangements. The talks were also to cover 
“trade plus” topics including rules for pub-
lic procurement, investment, intellectual 
property protection and patents, competi-
tion, data protection, and environmental 
and social safeguards. 
On 12 February 2013, US President 
Barack Obama, EU Commission President 
José Manuel Barroso and European Council 
President Herman Van Rompuy declared 
their intention to begin talks. At the recent 
G8 summit, the European Union and the 
United States launched the negotiations; 
the first round of talks will begin the week 
of July 8 in Washington, D.C. 
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A Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership would join together the world’s 
two largest economies. The European 
Union and United States account for 25.8 
percent of global goods exports (2011, 
excluding internal exports within the 
European Union), 43.7 percent of global 
service exports (again without EU internal 
trade) and 39.4 percent of global stocks of 
foreign direct investment (inward, not 
including internal EU stocks; all figures 
here from Eurostat or UN). With respect to 
its regulatory scope such an agreement 
would also be one of the world’s most com-
prehensive treaties. 
Why a TTIP? 
There are multiple reasons why a TTIP is 
desirable. Although Transatlantic trade is 
already strongly liberalised, with average 
applied tariffs of 4.0 percent (EU) and 3.3 
percent (US) on industrial goods and 13.9 
percent (EU) and approximately 5 percent 
(US) on agricultural products (WTO figures), 
the large volume of bilateral trade means 
that the growth effects of dismantling re-
maining barriers should not be underesti-
mated. Moreover, low average tariffs should 
not obscure the continuing existence of 
numerous peaks. In the European Union 
these are found above all in agriculture (up 
to 205 percent), in the United States on 
particular industrial products, especially 
textiles (42 percent), clothing (32 percent), 
and leather goods and footwear (56 per-
cent). Both sides also impose high tariffs 
on chemicals, transport equipment and 
medical goods. Tariffs aside, NTBs represent 
especially grave obstacles to trade and 
investment. Technical (regulatory) trade 
barriers affect above all pharmaceuticals 
and cosmetics, textiles and clothing, and 
the automotive sector. 
The European Union and the United 
States would benefit considerably if tariffs 
in bilateral trade could be abolished and 
NTBs dismantled. The study Reducing Trans-
atlantic Barriers to Trade and Investment, pub-
lished in March 2013 by the London-based 
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) 
forecasts the impact of a TTIP on prosperity 
for various liberalisation scenarios, ex-
pressed in terms of change in gross domes-
tic product (GDP). If only tariffs are elimi-
nated (“limited agreement” scenario: aboli-
tion of 98 percent of all tariffs), the authors 
expect an annual growth stimulus of 0.1 
percent (€23.8 billion) for the European 
Union and 0.04 percent (€9.4 billion) for 
the United States. The “comprehensive/ 
ambitious” scenario is more radical, assum-
ing the abolition of 98 percent of tariffs, 25 
percent of NTBs on goods and services and 
50 percent of procurement NTBs. Here, the 
European Union’s GDP would rise by 0.48 
percent (€119.2 billion) and the United 
States’ by 0.39 percent (€94.9 billion Euro) 
– a welcome boost for both economies. 
While the US economy is growing again, 
forecasts for the coming years are anything 
but rosy. For the European Union things 
look even worse. Numerous member-states 
are likely to slide into recession in 2013, 
and the debt crisis is anything but over. 
Stronger Transatlantic integration would 
also improve both partners’ competitive-
ness against emerging economies like 
China and India. According to the IMF, the 
EU-27’s share of global GDP fell from 34.1 
percent in 1980 to 25 percent in 2011. The 
situation with exports is similar. 
In 1980 the European Union accounted 
for 22.7 percent of global goods exports 
(current EU-27), by 2011 its share had fallen 
to 13.9 percent. The United States’ shares 
of global GDP and trade have also fallen 
steadily. While a TTIP is unlikely to reverse 
that trend, it could slow it, partly through 
the economies of scale businesses can 
achieve through improved access to the 
partner country’s markets and consumers 
and by reducing costs for businesses trad-
ing with or investing in the transatlantic 
partner. Moreover, by working together 
the European Union and United States 
could generate the economic and political 
strength to set global standards, for ex-
ample for security of investment or fair 
competition. The TTIP could conceivably
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Figure 1 
Main EU export markets Main US export markets 
(goods exports, 2011) (goods exports, 2011) 
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics (accessed 15 April 2013). 
Figure 2 
EU foreign direct investment US foreign direct investment 
(Outflows, 2011) (Outflows, 2011) 
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S.: Balance of Payments and Direct 
Investment Position Data, www.bea.gov/international/di1fdibal.htm; Eurostat (both accessed 15 April 2013). 
 
function as a test bed for new areas of 
regulation whose complex character has to 
date precluded their inclusion in negotia-
tions at the multilateral level. Initial testing 
of new rules in preferential trade agree-
ments (PTAs, such as free trade agreements 
and customs unions) is not without 
historical precedent. Examples include the 
liberalisation of the service sector at the 
European level and its subsequent 
inclusion in the GATT Uruguay Round 
(1986–1994). Preferential trade agreements 
like the TTIP can thus also inject momen-
tum into multilateral negotiations. 
The European Union has another impor-
tant reason to seek a TTIP with the United 
States: the talks on a Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship (TPP). Currently the United States is 
speaking with Australia, Brunei, Chile, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore 
and Vietnam about a “high-standard” agree-
ment. Japan, Mexico and Canada have also 
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signalled interest, with Canada and Mexico 
already officially invited to join; in 2013 the 
United States agreed to Japan’s participa-
tion. If the TPP countries receive preferen-
tial access to the US market that would 
represent a competitive disadvantage for 
European businesses. 
Risks Involved 
However, a TTIP is not without risks for 
global trade and the multilateral trade 
system. Discrimination against third 
countries is a central problem of preferen-
tial agreements. Selective tariff abolition 
can eliminate protectionism and distor-
tions between the signatories of such an 
agreement and create trade-generating and 
growth-boosting effects. As the economist 
Jacob Viner demonstrated in the 1950s, the 
bilateral/plurilateral abolition of trade 
barriers can increases trade if domestically 
produced goods and services or imports 
from third countries are substituted by 
cheaper (i.e. more efficiently produced) 
goods and services from the partner coun-
try. But frequently such an agreement leads 
to discrimination against third countries 
with trade-diverting effects. According to 
Viner, trade diversion occurs when the 
dismantling of trade barriers gives goods 
and services from the partner country a 
competitive advantage and consequently 
trade with third countries is diverted to the 
partner country even if the third country 
can produce the relevant goods and services 
more efficiently. 
One particular problem of preferential 
trade agreements is that they contain many 
different and contradictory rules. This 
applies above all to the rules of origin in 
free trade agreements (FTAs), which define 
which goods are granted preferential treat-
ment. To enjoy preferential market access a 
particular proportion of the product must 
be produced in one of the FTA signatory 
countries. This is intended to prevent non-
signatories from profiting from preferential 
treatment without themselves making con-
cessions. Cumulatively, the multiplicity of 
preferential trade agreements has produced 
a confusion of different rules of origin that 
tangibly obstruct trade. Small and medium-
sized enterprises in particular suffer from 
high transaction costs. Worries that a TTIP 
would exacerbate the “spaghetti bowl effect” 
identified by economist Jagdish Bhagwati in 
the 1990s are certainly justified. 
A study by the German ifo-Institut pub-
lished in January 2013 argues that coun-
tries geographically close to the United 
States or the European Union, countries 
with a high volume of trade with either or 
both of them, and countries with free trade 
agreements with either or both must ex-
pect to lose trade through a TTIP. For the 
United States this means in the first place 
Canada and Mexico, primarily through 
erosion of the preferential access to the US 
market both enjoy through the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
but also through trade-diverting effects. 
Australia, which has a FTA with the United 
States, is also a loser in both liberalisation 
scenarios (comprehensive agreement or 
tariff elimination). 
Another problem is that the TTIP talks 
could tie up a considerable proportion of 
EU and US negotiating capacity. Both sides 
are already involved in numerous bilateral 
and plurilateral negotiations. The European 
Union is currently negotiating FTAs with 
Canada, Japan and Mercosur, the United 
States, as already mentioned, with the TPP 
countries. Additional Transatlantic talks 
thus threaten to overstretch both execu-
tives and could further diminish interest in 
a successful conclusion of the Doha Round. 
Should the European Union and United 
States fail to conclude the bilateral talks 
within a reasonable timeframe they also 
risk damage to their reputations as capable 
political actors and their credibility as pro-
ponents of open markets. But speedy con-
clusion will be no easy matter with so many 
sensitive topics involved. Many European 
states reject liberalisation of agricultural 
trade, and France has recently succeeded in 
excluding cultural services from the talks. 
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Finally, a TTIP could also have unintend-
ed political repercussions. Emerging econo-
mies and developing countries could inter-
pret it as an instrument of exclusion or 
even an attempt to blackmail them into 
making concessions in the Doha Round. In 
the worst case this threatens to block the 
already difficult WTO talks. While such 
scenarios are certainly plausible, the Trans-
atlantic partners have options for counter-
acting them. 
Ensure WTO Compatibility 
Their economic and political weight lends 
the European Union and United States a 
special responsibility for the world trade 
order. Thus, how must the TTIP be designed 
if it is to benefit rather than harm the 
multilateral trading system? In the first 
place it must be compatible with WTO rules 
and serve as a stepping stone for future 
global liberalisation regimes. Firstly, the 
Transatlantic Partnership should liberalise 
trade and address trade plus issues. Second-
ly, it should standardise rules in order to 
simplify the “spaghetti bowl” of competing 
and contradictory rules. Thirdly, it should 
be open for new members to avoid exclu-
sion. And fourthly, it should recognise the 
WTO as the central arbitration instance and 
avoid undermining its dispute settlement 
procedure. 
Comprehensive Liberalisation 
Preferential trade agreements contradict 
the central WTO principle of most-favoured 
nation treatment (MFN), because they grant 
partners benefits that are denied to others. 
Accordingly, they are permitted only as 
an intermediate step in the multilateral 
liberalisation process and subject to rules 
laid out in GATT Article XXIV (for trade in 
goods) and GATS Article V (for trade in 
services). 
Paragraphs 4 to 10 of the GATT Article 
define the conditions under which customs 
unions and free trade zones may be created. 
These involve definition of such entities, 
duty of notification, treatment of third 
countries, etc. Paragraphs 8 (a) (i) (customs 
unions) and 8 (b) (free trade agreements), 
under which the tariffs for “substantially 
all the trade” must be dismantled, are 
especially important. Under paragraph 5 
(b), the external duties of countries partici-
pating in a free trade zone must not be 
higher than before conclusion of the agree-
ment. Given that these conditions would 
also apply to the TTIP, it would be impossi-
ble to exclude whole sectors from liberali-
sation. Removing agriculture from the TTIP 
talks, as proposed by Renate Künast, leader 
of the Green Party parliamentary group in 
the German Bundestag, would thus contra-
dict WTO rules. 
GATS Article V defines the conditions for 
economic integration in the service sector a 
little more loosely. The Partnership would 
only need to have “substantial sectoral 
coverage” rather than covering all sectors. 
Agreements must also provide for “the 
absence or elimination of substantially all 
discrimination … between or among the 
parties”. Exceptions are thus permitted, 
and GATS also provides exemptions for 
cultural services, but the goal should be for 
a TTIP to cover at least all services that are 
in line for liberalisation through the WTO. 
But the ambitions of the TTIP should not 
end with the scope and depth of WTO regu-
lation. Instead it would be desirable for the 
talks to reach beyond the traditional realm 
of the WTO and address the aforemen-
tioned trade plus issues. New cross-cutting 
issues like treatment of state-run compa-
nies and stronger integration of small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) should 
also be included. With these issues of 
broader interest a first step could be taken 
towards global regulation. 
Harmonised Rules 
As already mentioned, one drawback of the 
numerous existing preferential agreements 
is that they create an increasingly complex 
tangle of rules that tend to hamper rather 
than ease free trade. Special attention must 
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be given to rules of origin. The European 
Union and the United States should ensure 
that any new rules of origin do not worsen 
the global regulatory chaos and are compat-
ible with the pre-existing FTAs of both sides. 
The rules should also be as generous as 
possible in order to prevent the danger of 
trade diversion and the associated discrimi-
nation against third states. At the same 
time it would make sense to extend market 
access and new rules for investment or 
procurement to other trade partners that 
are willing in return to liberalise their 
markets to the same extent. 
Openness to New Members 
If a preferential agreement is not to harm 
the multilateral trading order it must be 
open to third countries. The TTIP is no 
exception. Initially it will be negotiated 
solely between the European Union and 
the United States. But in the long term it 
would be desirable to expand it to the 
whole NAFTA region, especially given that 
the European Union already has a free 
trade agreement with Mexico and is cur-
rently negotiating one with Canada. The 
more members a preferential agreement 
comprises, the smaller the trade-diverting 
effects and the greater the chances of 
multilateralisation. 
Uphold WTO Dispute Settlement 
Even after conclusion of the TTIP, the Euro-
pean Union and the United States should 
conduct their bilateral disputes mainly 
before the WTO and promptly implement 
its rulings. It would set a poor example if 
the Transatlantic partners were to with-
draw from the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism. 
According to the European Commission, 
the European Union currently has twenty-
two complaints against the United States 
outstanding at the WTO (of a total of fifty-
five EU complaints against WTO members). 
Three of these are in the panel process that 
begins if the parties fail to agree on a com-
promise in the consultation phase. The 
three cases concern subsidies on civil 
aircraft (Boeing), copyright, and American 
use of anti-dumping duties under the Byrd 
Amendment. The United States has nine 
outstanding complaints against the Euro-
pean Union (out of twenty-nine in all). Here 
too, three conflicts are in the panel process: 
Airbus, geographical indications, and the 
widely noted dispute over genetically 
modified foods. 
But not all disputes should be dealt with 
at WTO level; some should certainly be 
resolved bilaterally. This applies for ex-
ample to the sensitive field of consumer 
protection, where disputes dragging on for 
decades demonstrate the limits of WTO 
procedures. Conflicts over issues for which 
the WTO possesses inadequate rules should 
be resolved bilaterally. This includes the 
Airbus/Boeing dispute over illicit subsidies 
that has been before the WTO for years 
without any resolution in sight. Such dis-
putes bear considerable potential for con-
flict and unnecessarily burden the WTO 
dispute settlement procedure. 
Strengthen the WTO 
In order for the TTIP talks not to endanger 
the multilateral trade system it is not 
enough to ensure compatibility of rule-
books. Rather, the European Union and the 
United States must work for a rapid con-
clusion of the Doha Round. Even if the 
negotiating capacities of both sides are 
likely to be stretched by Transatlantic talks, 
the Doha Round should remain top prior-
ity. Firstly, this is the only way for the 
European Union and the United States to 
open up the attractive markets of rapidly 
growing emerging economies and develop-
ing countries. Both have already concluded 
bilateral free trade agreements with numer-
ous countries in this group, such as South 
Korea. But the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa) are not on the list. 
The European Union is negotiating with 
India and Brazil (the latter in the scope of 
talks with Mercosur) but as yet without 
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success. The United States currently has no 
plans for agreements with these countries. 
Secondly, the long standstill in the Doha 
Round endangers the credibility of the 
WTO and could in the medium to long 
term negatively impact its dispute settle-
ment procedure, on which the European 
Union and United States depend to deal 
with the growing number of trade conflicts 
with emerging economies, especially China. 
For almost twelve years the Doha Round 
has been discussing improved market 
access for agricultural products, industrial 
goods, and services, as well as environ-
mental issues, strengthening multilateral 
rules and improving the integration of 
developing countries in world trade. It was 
originally scheduled to conclude in 2005, 
but every self-imposed deadline since then 
has been missed. The most recent ministe-
rial conference at the end of 2011 failed to 
achieve a breakthrough. 
The goal of the next ministerial confer-
ence, scheduled for December 2013 in Bali, 
is to pass a minimum package including 
trade facilitation and certain agricultural 
aspects that are especially important for 
developing and least developed countries 
(LDCs). The European Union and the United 
States should support such a package even 
if it promises little benefit for themselves, 
as this would signal their continuing 
commitment to the Doha Round and the 
WTO. The European Union and United 
States should implement the concessions 
they made at the Hong Kong ministerial 
conference in 2005, where they agreed to 
abolish agricultural export subsidies and 
open their own markets to products from 
LDCs. The United States should make con-
cessions especially on cotton. 
After adoption of such a minimum 
package, the next step would be to decide 
how to proceed with the Doha Round. If it 
is clear that timely agreement will be im-
possible it would make sense to end the 
round provisionally in order to lift the 
blockade of the WTO. Then new topics that 
do not presently fall under WTO rules, such 
as investment, information technology and 
possibly further-reaching questions such as 
resources and energy or strengthening 
global supply chains, could be tackled first. 
These topics are becoming increasingly 
important for industrial countries as well 
as for emerging economies and developing 
countries. If the WTO fails to expand its 
regime to these areas it risks becoming 
irrelevant. Nor can its dispute settlement 
procedure hope to effectively resolve new 
trade conflicts without corresponding 
rules. 
Plurilateral agreements within the WTO 
should also remain under consideration. 
Currently the European Union and the 
United States are engaged in the “Really 
Good Friends of Services” group of twenty-
one WTO members that has been conduct-
ing plurilateral negotiations on further 
liberalisation in the service sector since 
early 2012. The group also includes emerg-
ing economies like Mexico, Chile and South 
Korea; in 2010 the group accounted for 
about two thirds of global trade in services. 
Such a plurilateral agreement would allow 
signatories to open their markets more 
widely to one another. But it must be en-
sured that such agreements respect the 
WTO principle of most-favoured nation 
treatment. 
A strong WTO is important for the 
European Union and the United States, 
especially as China, Brazil and India gain 
weight in international trade policy. Even 
if the Transatlantic partners agree a TTIP, 
the importance of clear global trade rules 
that are accepted by the emerging econo-
mies and enforceable through the WTO 
will continue to increase. The European 
Union and the United States should there-
fore design their agreement to be WTO-
compatible and to incentivise the Doha 
Round, as NAFTA did in the 1990s for the 
Uruguay Round. A successful TTIP could 
thus also help achieve a breakthrough in 
the Doha Round. 
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